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NON-DISCLOSURE: SOME
COMPARISONS
Paul Walker*
The question of disclosure, what is and what is not required to be disclosed when a contract is
created, has long been a vexed problem in insurance law. This article considers recent
developments in the law on this question and notes the possibility Of the development of the
further development of a proportionality approach.
I INTRODUCTION
In their excellent recent book,1 Anthony Duggan, Michael Bryan and Frances Hanks
remind us that the law and morality of non-disclosure were discussed by Cicer02 over 2000
years ago. Cicero takes some hypothetical facts which are the subject of an imaginary
dialogue between two philosophers. A grain merchant is on board his ship carrying a cargo
of corn from Alexandria to Rhodes at a time of famine. In the course of the voyage, the
merchant overtakes other vessels taking corn to Rhodes. On arrival at Rhodes, is the
merchant under a duty to tell the Rhodians about the other ships, or may he remain silent
and sell his cargo at the famine price? Diogenes says that a merchant is not obliged to
disclose everything that it would be useful for a buyer to know: provided he remains
truthful, the merchant may remain silent. The famous phrase which Cicero attributes to him
is that "concealing is one thing, not revealing is another" (aliud est celare, aliud tacere). By
contrast his pupil Antipater says that a duty exists to reveal the information. He says this
duty arises from the bond of community that links every person in the world to each other.
Cicero agrees with Antipater, and asserts that Antipater's moral position represents Roman
law.
* Senior Lecturer in Law, Victoria University of Wellington.
1 Contractual Non-Disclosure (Longman Professional, Melbourne, 1994).
2 In his treatise on duties, De (20?cils.
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As is well known, by the early 19th century English3 and American' cases on the
general law of contract had plumped for Diogenes. In the general law of contract there must
be something exceptional about the conduct of the non-discloser before the court will
intervene.5 But there is one field of contract law where this is not the case: insurance. "The
insurance contract is the sole remaining survivor in common law systems of that special
category of transactions known as the 'contract of the utmost good faith', and the obligation
to disclose derives from the nature of that contract."6
In this article I shall give an outline (necessarily selective) of how some aspects of the
duty of disclosure in insurance contracts have fared in four common law jurisdictions
(America, England, Australia, and New Zealand).
II AMERICA
The law of the United States of America of course is not unitary. The insurance law of
the USA comprises the laws of 50 states and a Federal District. Every state has its own
insurance code which may codify the rule of disclosure. Nevertheless it is possible to make
some reasonably accurate generalisations.
A first generalisation is that American law distinguishes marine and non-marine risks.
In the case of marine risks, American courts have adopted a doctrine which appears similar
to that of other common law jurisdictions. Couch defines the doctrine in this way:7
Concealment in marine insurance is the failure to disclose any material fact or circumstance in
relation to the subject matter of the contract which may increase the liability to loss, or affect
the risk or obligation assumed, and which is, in fact or law, within, or which ought to be
within, the knowledge of one party, and of which the other party has not actual or
presumptive knowledge.
3 Fox v Makreth (1788) 2 Cox Eq Cas 320.
4 Inidlaw v Organ 15 US (2 Wheat) 178 (181D.
5 Duggan et al, above n 1, 12-13, give four main categories: (1) knowledge by the non-discloser of a mistake by
the other party; (2) active concealment (amounting to misrepresentation) by the non-discloser; (3) knowledge by
the non-discloser of a disability affecting the other party's party capacity for informed consent; (4) abuse by the
non-discloser of a position of trust.
6 Duggan et al, above n 1, 13. At 79ff the authors discuss the limited disclosure obligation in contracts of
guarantee (as to which, see now Westpac Banking Corporation v Robinson (1993) 30 NSWLR 668, noted by
Murdoch (1995) 8 JCL 286); and Levitt v Barclays Bank [1995] 1 WLR 1260.
7 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law (2ed, Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co, New York, 1985) vol 9, §
38.75. In contrast to Cicero, Couch appears to use "concealment" to mean "actionable non-disclosure".
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But in relation to non-marine insurance American jurisprudence is not so strict. In this
context it has been stated that:8
... concealment exists and avoids the policy where the insured has knowledge of a fact
material to the risk which honesty, good faith, and fair dealing require that he should
communicate to the insurer but which he designedly and intentionally withholds.
Francis Achampong, writing in 1987, observedg that the rationale for the stricter rule
for non-disclosure in marine insurance was the difficulty of predicting the perils which an
ocean-going vessel might encounter, and the impracticality of using specific questionnaires.
He also drew attentionlo to a suggestion that this stricter rule was applied in other areas of
insurance where the insured had greater knowledge of the risks involved (such as title
insurance). Achampong's conclusion was that the relatively equal bargaining power and
business acumen of the parties relieved any pressures for change of the law in relation to
marine insurance. He recognised that a constant adjustment to changing circumstances was
required in order to fashion the distinctions and exceptions in the United States, but
considered that the courts in that country had taken cognisance of present realities, changed
circumstances and the difference between marine and non-marine underwriting. In his view
the satisfactory state of the American position was a tribute to judicial activism.11
The most recent developments in America are described in an article12 by Deborah F
Cohen, Timothy E DeMasi, and Aaron Krauss. They report that while the Fifth Circuit of
the US Court of Appeals has moved13 towards a less strict rule in marine insurance
(equating the position with the rules as to non-disclosure applicable in non-marine
insurance), this move has been repudiated by the Federal Court for the Southern District of
the State of New York (which forms part of the Second Circuit).14 Further, recent decisions
in the United States have asserted that the stricter rule of disclosure is applicable to
contracts of reinsurance, even where the reinsurance is non-marine in nature.15
8 Above n 7, § 38.2.
9 "Uberrima Fides in Insurance Law" (1987) 36 ICLQ 329,339.
10 Above n 9, 339, footnote 45, citing Gerace and Sandow, "Uberrimae Fidei and Al-Risk Policies: Revival of a
Historic Defense" (1986) Insurance Counsel Journal, January, 154, 156.
11 Achampong, above n 9, 345-347.
12 "Uberrimae Fidei and Reinsurance Rescission: Does a Gentlemen's Agreement have a Place in Today's
Commercial Market?" (1994) 29 Tort & Ins U 602.
13 In Albany Ins Co v Anh Thi Kieu 927 F 2d 882 (5th Cir), cert denied, 112 S Ct 279 (1991).
14 See Employers Ins v Triton Lines Inc No 88 Civ 5276, 1991 WL 190592 (SDNY Sept 18, 1991).
15 Cohen et al, above n 12, citing Security Mutual Casualty Co v 4#iliated FM Insurance Co 471 F 2d 238, 241 (8th
Cir 1972), Carlingford Australia General Insurance Ltd v St Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co 722 F Supp 48
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III ENGLAND
When examining the law of non-disclosure in England it is vitally important to
distinguish between the law and the practice of insurance. I deal first with the law and
second with the practice.
A The Law
The Marine Insurance Act 1906 provides by ss 17 and 18:
17. Insurance is uberrimae fidei
A contract of marine insurance is a contract based on the utmost good faith, and, if
the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by
the other party.
18. Disclosure by assured
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the assured must disclose to the
insurer, before the contract is concluded, every material circumstance known
to the assured, and the assured is deemed to know every circumstance which,
in the ordinary course of business, ought to be known by him. If the assured
fails to make such disclosure, the insurer may avoid the contract.
(2) Every circumstance is material which would influence the judgment of a
prudent insurer in fixing the premium or determining whether he will take
the risk.
(3) In the absence of inquiry the following circumstances need not be disclosed,
namely:
(a) Any circumstance which diminishes the risk:
(b) Any circumstance known or presumed to be known to the insurer.
The insurer is presumed to know matters of common notoriety or
knowledge, and matters which an insurer in the ordinary course of his
business, as such, ought to know:
(c) Any circumstance as to which information is waived by the insurer:
(d) Any circumstance which it is superfluous to disclose by reason of any
express or implied warranty.
(SDNY 1989), Sumitomo Marine & Fire Insurance Co v Cologne Reinsurance Co 552 NE 2d 139 (NY 1989), and
Christiania General Insurance Corp v Great American Insurance Co 745 F Supp 150 (SDNY 1990)
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(4) Whether any particular circumstance, which is not disclosed, is material or not
is, in each case, a question of fact.
(5) The term "circumstance" includes any communication made to, or
information received by, the assured.
In the most recent English non-disclosure case to reach the House of Lords, Pan Atlantic
Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd,16 it was observed by Lord Musti1117 that in
relevant respects the common law relating to marine and non-marine insurance is the same,
and the Act embodies a partial codification of the common law.
Thus the strict rule applied in the United States to marine insurance (and relaxed in most
cases of non-marine insurance) is applied by English law with much the same rigour
whether the insurance in question be marine or non-marine. There is a respect in which it
appears that the two may differ in English law: this is the question whether the assured
need disclose those things which the assured does not know but ought to know in the
ordinary course of business. Section 18 plainly requires such disclosure if the risk is
marine. It is not entirely clear that such a requirement is imposed by the common law in
cases of non-marine insurance.18 The point was presumably not mentioned by Lord Mustill
in Pan Atlantic because it did not arise in that case.
In his speech19 in Pan Atlantic Lord Mustill listed criticisms which had been made of
English law as it then stood, and dealt with them in two groups. The first group was of
criticisms which (he said) the House of Lords in its judicial capacity was powerless to
remedy. Among them were the following:
(i) The law deprives the assured of a recovery for a genuine loss by perils insured
against even if the misrepresentation or non-disclosure had no bearing on the risk
which brought about the loss.
(ii) The law deprives the assured of the whole of his recovery even if a full and accurate
disclosure would have done no more than cause the underwriter to insist on one rate
of premium rather than another.
16 [1995] 1 AC 501.
17 Above n 16, 518.
18 Ivamy General Principles of Insurance Law (6 ed, Butterworths, London, 1993) 140; and Clarke law of Insurance
Contracts (2 ed, Lloyd's, London, 1994) 579-582 equate marine and non-marine; by contrast the editors of
McGillivray Insurance Low (8 ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1988) say McNair J left the question open in
Australia and New Zealand Bank v Colonial Wharves [1960]2 Lloyd's Rep 241.
19 [1995] 1 AC 501, 528.
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(iii) The law fails to take account of whether a reasonable person seeking insurance
would appreciate that a particular circumstance was material and ought to be
disclosed.
The criticisms which the House of Lords was able to consider included:
(i) The law ought to be that a circumstance is material only if its disclosure would
decisively have influenced the mind of the prudent underwriter (a criticism rejected
by the majority of their Lordships).
(ii) A defence of misrepresentation or non-disclosure could succeed even if the actual
underwriter's mind was unaffected is contrary to common sense and justice (a
criticism accepted by all their Lordships, and remedied in their speeches).
Commentators20 on Pan Atlantic expressed concern that the requirement of actual
inducement would mean little in practice, for (as Lord Mustill himself pointed out) once the
materiality of the undisclosed fact was established, there may be a presumption that non-
disclosure induced the contract. In the words of Clive Boxer:21
Little has really changed. It is still all or nothing; it is still the views of a prudent independent
underwriter that count for materiality; and unless the underwriter makes a complete fool of
himself in the witness box there will be a presumption of iiiducement in his favour.
Subsequent cases have done little to allay this concern.
In March 1995, Longmore J delivered judgment in Marc Rich & Co AG v Portman.22 The
case concerned a charterers' liability policy, extended by endorsements to include liability
for delay at the ports of Ain Sukhna and Constanza. At issue was whether past experience
should have been disclosed by the insured charterer, and would have made a difference to
the underwriter's decision. The judge's findings after evidence had been given by the
underwriter who scratched the slip for the endorsements (Mr Overton) might be described
as devastating:23
He knew virtually nothing about the sort of liabilities likely to be incurred by charterers of
ships; he had never seen a charterparty, could not define demurrage and had no concept of
laytime or notices of readiness. He had no idea what the Asba 2 form was and did not know
20 Eg Hamilton "Development in the duty of disclosure" (1994) 144 NU 1313; Birds and Hird "Misrepresentation
and Non-disclosure in Insurance Law - Identical Twins or Separate Issues?" (1996) 59 MLR 285; Boxer "Pine
Top emerges above Atlantic" (1994) 138 Sol Jo 936.
21 Boxer, above n 20, 937.
2 2 [1996] 1 Uoyd's Rep 430.
2 3 Above n 22,438.
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how to find a copy. He had no idea whether liabilities incurred by charterers were capable of
being passed on to any third parties; he had no idea of any loss experience of Marc Rich
relevant to the endorsements.
When dealing with such an obviously incompetent underwriter the circumstances might
seem propitious for a submission that the underwriter would not have been induced to do
anything different had charterer's experience been disclosed. But appearances were
deceptive. When rejecting the submission, Longmore J made some interesting observations
about the relevance of what had been done by the underwriter on other occasions:24
Mr Overton was naturally pressed by Mr Kealey to admit that, since he regarded the
extension of the risk set out in the endorsement as so very minor, it would have made no
difference to him if he had been shown a document recording that there were substantial,
but ex hypothesi irrelevant, demurrage liabilities which had been incurred previously by Marc
Rich at the relevant ports. Mr Overton's answer was:
"If I was shown a record with that information on it, the question I am sure I would have
asked is: We are definitely not covering these instances..... I would have just confirmed,
sighting our records, that we were not covering those".
Mr Kealey submitted that I should not accept that answer since it was obviously self-serving
and inconsistent with the true picture of a man who had abrogated his underwriting
functions and existed in an intellectual "stupor."
A submission of this kind has to my mind, to be tested against the overall conduct of Mr
Overton in relation to the Marc Rich risk. Mr Saloman, indeed, submitted that I could not
reach such a conclusion by looking at only 2 or 3 underwritings and that it would be necessary
to look at Mr Overton's writings for a number of years. This turned out to be a peculiarly
unattractive submission when it emerged that insurers had been asked to disclose Mr
Overton's writings over a period of 5 years and that they had declined to do so.
It would, however, be a most unfortunate consequence of the House of Lords' decision in
Pan Atlantic v Pine Top if cases of this kind were to be saturated with inquiries about a plethora
of risks written by the actual underwriter on occasions other than the time when the relevant
risk was itself written. In my view the question whether the actual underwriter was induced
to write the relevant risk is to be determined by reference to the actual risks underwritten
and their immediate context. The question in this case is then whether the underwriter
abrogated his functions in relation to these risks not in relation to numerous other risks written
on different occasions cf Merchant Insurance Co v Davie [1937] 2 All ER 767.
24 Above n 22, 440-441.
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unlikely that the law will be changed in this advantageous way in the foreseeable future
...However, my Terms of Reference require me to reach a decision which I consider in all the
circumstances would be a fair and reasonable resolution of the dispute. ... if the
circumstances are such that I could conclude, on a balance of probabilities, that any non-
disclosure was innocent I would not allow the insurer to avoid the policy but would require it
to adopt the proportionality principle.
Thus in cases of private insurance taken out by UK policyholders avoidance for non-
disclosure is only available where the insured could reasonably be expected to have
disclosed the matter in question, and even in such a case the Ombudsman will (absent
sufficient evidence of fraud) allow the insured a proportionate recovery where the risk
would have been written following disclosure at a higher premium.32
IV AUSTRALIA
Australia, like America, is not a unitary state, but its Constitution gives the Federal
Parliament law-making power in relation to insurance.33 This enabled the Federal
Parliament to bring about major reform of insurance law by enacting the Insurance
Contracts Act 1984. The Act is based upon a report of the Australian Law Reform
Commission.
Section 21(1) of the 1984 Act provides:
Subject to this Act, an insured has a duty to disclose to the insurer, before the relevant
contract of insurance is entered into, every matter that is known to the insured, being a
matter that -
(a) the insured knows to be a matter relevant to the decision of the insurer whether to
accept the risk and, if so, on what terms; or
(b) a reasonable person in the circumstances could be expected to know to be a matter so
relevant.
32 The Ombudsman's proportionality approach also meant that he would permit an insured full recovery if the
risk would have been written in any event, a result which coincides with the law after the House of Lords
decision in Pan Atlantic.
33 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, s 51 (xiv); there is an exclusion in respect of State
insurance, but the individual State insurers have been subjected to relevant Commonwealth legislation (either
by agreement or by State legislation).
34 Australian Law Reform Commission Insurance Liw Report No 20 (1982).
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Thus the 1984 Act in this regard alters the common law's insurer oriented perspective
and adopts a position which is in most respects similar to that of the UK General
Statements.35
There has been some controversy about the subjectiveness of the test in s21, both in
relation to "the insurer" in s21(1)(a) and in relation to the meaning of "in the circumstances"
in s21(1)(b).
First the obligation arises in relation to matters "relevant to the decision of the insurer"
- but does this mean the actual insurer or a hypothetical prudent insurer? Rogers CJ held in
Ayoub v Lombard Insurance Co Must) Pty Ltd6 that the common law test was to be applied
so that what was relevant was to be determined having regard to a prudent insurer acting
reasonably. By contrast in Twenty-first Maylux Pty Ltd v Mercantile Mutual Insurance
(Australia) Ltd37 Brooking J preferred an approach by reference to the concerns of the
particular individual insurer. The latter approach seems more consistent with the words of
the statute.38
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly in practice, the question arises as to how
broadly or narrowly one should look at the particular case when asking whether "a
reasonable person in the circumstances could be expected to know" that the matter was
relevant. This question also arose in the Twenty-jirst Maylux case: here Brooker J thought
that the test did not take into account personal idiosyncrasies of the insured such as
imperfect understanding of English. In Western Australia Judge Keall took a different
view:39 he posited "a reasonable person with the state of knowledge and having the
educational background of' the insured. These extreme positions have the potential to
operate harshly on insured and insurer; a better approach might be to take the view that "in
the circumstances" means "in the circumstances known to both parties."
The 1984 Act also makes specific provision for remedies. Section 28(1) establishes
inducement of the insurer as a pre-requisite to remedy for non-disclosure or
35 Note that under s 21, only those matters which are in fact known to the insured constitute candidates for
disclosure; cf the UK Statements which seem to leave this open by precluding avoidance by reference to facts
"which the policyholder could not reasonably be expected to have disclosed."
36 (1989) 5 ANZ Ins Cas 60-933 (NSW Supreme Court), adopting obiter remarks of Samuels JA in Toikan
International Insurance Broking Pty Ltd v Mossel Windows Australia Pty Ltd (1989) 5 ANZ Ins Cas 60-903.
3 7 (1990) 6 ANZ Ins Cas 60-954 (Supreme Court of Victoria).
38 The editors of the ANZ Insurance Reporter suggest ( 6-020, p 10,967) that the difference may not matter,
because the duty of good faith prevents the insurer from acting capriciously or without foundation in making a
determination as to whether a particular matter is relevant or not.
39 In Delphin v Lumley General Insurance Ltd (1989) 5 ANZ Ins Cas 60-941, appeal dismissed without comment
on this point (1990) 6 ANZ Ins Cas 60-986.
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misrepresentation. Section 28(2) permits avoidance in cases of fraud (but subject to a
discretion given to the court by s31). By s28(3), in cases where avoidance is not permitted
or is eschewed:
... the liability of the insurer in respect of a claim is reduced to the amount that would place
him in a position in which he would have been if the failure [to disclose] had not occurred or
the misrepresentation had not been made.
This is an approach which at first sight seems similar to the "proportionality" approach
advocated by Nicholls V-C and adopted by the UK Ombudsman. But it is based on a
different principle. Take a case where the risk would have been written at a higher
premium. Once it is ascertained that the insurer would have written the risk,40 albeit on
different terms as to premium, the court is to set off the additional premium which would
have been charged against the claim.
The 1984 Act is not applicable to certain contracts and proposed contracts.41 Among
the excluded contracts are those of reinsurance, those to which the Marine Insurance Act
applies, and those concerning aircraft engaged in commercial operations. Other exclusions
involve registered health benefits, friendly societies, workers compensation and motor
insurance (death and personal injuries). The result is that there are numerous regimes of
non-disclosure, and this can no doubt cause anomalies. To some extent these have been
dealt with by the insurance industry: for example, under a Code of Practice pleasure craft
are assumed by the insurance industry to be within the 1984 Act.42
V NEW ZEALAND
The law of non-disclosure in New Zealand is reviewed elsewhere in this publication by
Malcolm Shelton-Agar and Helen Cruse.3 As they observe:
(i) There has been a suggestion from Sir Robin Cool<e4 that a full court of five judges
might overturn the common law prudent insurer test of materiality in favour of a
focus on the reasonable insured.
40 Australian courts have generally rejected a suggestion by Deane J in Advance (NSW) Insurance Agencies v
Matthews (1989) 5 ANZ Ins Cas 60-910 that because one could not reduce an amount to nil, one had to
assume that the insurer had written the contract: see ANZ Insurance Reporter 16-030,10,984 to 10,991.
41 See s 9.
42 Derek Luxford of Phillips Fox in Sydney has suggested that the industry had misunderstood the law in this
respect: see p 34 of The Marine Insurance Act: Chronologically challenged legislation.7 (a paper delivered at the
November 1995 conference held in Wellington by the Maritime Law Association of Australia and New
Zealand).
43 In "Nefarious Activities: to disclose or not to disclose."
44 In State Insurance v McHale [1992] 2 NZLR 399, 405.
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(ii) The Court of Appeal in Gate v Sun Alliance45 suggested that good faith required
insurers to signal that fair and accurate answers to questions might not discharge an
insured's obligations.
Perhaps as a result of these indications, the Fair Insurance Code adopted by the
Insurance Council of New Zealand requires members, at the time of a customer's taking out
or renewing insurance, to "advise customers of their duty to tell the insurance company of
all facts which will affect the insurance company's assessment of the risk in providing
insurance cover."
Statutory reform of the law of contract in general and of the law of insurance in
particular was a consistent feature of New Zealand legislation in 1970s and 1980s. But
non-disclosure is not specifically dealt with in these reforms. Craig Brown has pointed
Out46 that shortly before its abolition the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee
indicated that it would return to the question of non-disclosure at a later date,7 while the
Law Commission, with its more general focus, has not yet turned its attention to the topic. It
is nevertheless important to bear in mind that more general statutes may have an important
practical effect where there has been non-disclosure. Among these are:
(i) The provisions as to the supply of services in the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993.
The definition of "service" contained in s2 expressly extends to a contract of
insurance (including life assurance and life reassurance). I have suggested on other
occasions48 that this may have a considerable impact. In particular, by s29, unless
the consumer#9 does not rely (or unreasonably relies) on the insurer's skill or
judgment there is a guarantee that the insurance will be:-
(a) Reasonably fit for any particular purpose; and
(b) Of such a nature and quality that it can reasonably be expected to achieve any
particular result that the [insured] makes known to the [insurer], before or at
the time of the making of the contract [of insurance], as the particular
45 Unreported, 5 April 1995, Court of Appeal, CA 37/94.
46 In "Unfinished business: Misrepresentation and Non-disclosure in Insurance Proposals" (1994) 16 NZULR
195, 196.
47 Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee Aspects of Insurance Law (2) ¢Wellington, 1983) 40.
48 In an address to the NZ Insurance Law Association, August 1994, and at a VUW Law Faculty and Wellington
District Law Society Seminar, 6 September 1994.
49 Defined in s 2 in such a way as to include those acquiring insurance for personal, domestic or household use or
consumption.
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purpose for which the service is required or the result that the consumer
desires to achieve, as the case may be...
Is, for example, motor vehicle insurance reasonably fit for its purpose if it can be
avoided for failure to disclose something which the insured did not know but ought
in the ordinary course of business to have known? Or if the fact not disclosed was
material but a reasonable insured (as opposed to the prudent underwriter) would
not have appreciated this?
(ii) Fair Trading Act 1988: The statute is of mandatory application. It has been held that
mere failure to warn of duty of disclosure is not misleading conduct.50
(iii) The Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 was applied to an insurance contract in
Wijeyaratne v Medical Assurance Society NZ Ltd,51 where the insured and insurer
both wrongly thought that in the event of damage to a specified vehicle the insured
could make a valid claim. This was wrong because the insured had no interest in the
vehicle. But it was held to be a common mistake and relief was granted by Hillyer J
under the statute. By parity of reasoning, can one say that if an insured and insurer
both mistakenly think that all relevant matters have been disclosed, the statute comes
into play?
Scope exists in New Zealand for the practice on non-disclosure to differ from the law.
Specifically in relation to the question of "proportional" recovery, I have been informed by
the Insurance Ombudsman, Terry Weir, that while he is aware of the question, it has not yet
arisen in a concrete case. We shall have to wait and see.
50 See the discussion of Gate v Sun Alliance and Quinby v General Accident in Shelton-Agar and Cruse, above n 43.
51 [1991] 2 NZLR 332.
